Bangkok has once more let political priorities trump security considerations, with predictable results.

UP to a fortnight ago, the latest “peace process” for southern Thailand that was supposed to trundle along since February was meandering.

Thai delegation leader and National Security Council head Paradorn Pattanathabutr, and chief negotiator for the BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional) rebels Hassan Thoyib, were supposedly poring over the details of each other’s positions.

There were doubts all round about the prospects of the negotiations, given the known circumstances. Since then, however, things have cleared up considerably – by deteriorating.

Two Sundays ago Hassan posted on YouTube five demands for a cessation of violence in the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. That effectively spelt the end of any productive talks.

In submitting his terms to YouTube, Hassan showed that he was addressing an audience other than the Thai government. But his chief motive appears to be to subvert the very process he began because he no longer had faith in its success.

To the initiated, this latest attempt at talking peace was ill-fated from the start. Both sides must have known it was going nowhere as soon as it had begun.

Hassan’s own status among the rebels is questionable. Not only did he have no mandate to speak for the BRN, some BRN leaders even opposed his role in the talks.

However, that little detail did not stop Paradorn from describing Hassan as the real rebel leader. Other Thai officials privately expressed a different view.

To realists, the only reason Hassan is in the picture at all is his connection with the Wadah faction of the BRN reportedly affiliated to the governing Pheu Thai party. That means both sides of the “talks” had been engineered by the current Thai government, with all the limitations and pitfalls that implies.

On the Thai government side, things were no better. The unofficial involvement of ousted former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was enough to sour matters with Thailand’s southern community, which had to bear the brunt of his ruthless excesses.

Officially, this latest stab at peace was launched with great fanfare by Thaksin’s sister, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, with her Malaysian counterpart Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak representing Malaysia as “facilitator”. Then Yingluck swiftly withdrew from the process and let it slide, in vain hopes that it would soar.

Even Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung, tasked with security affairs, and Interior Minister Charubutr Ruangsuwan did not relate well to the talks.

As a result, rebels on the ground and army commander-in-chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha came to share the same perspective: no point banking on the talks. And since nobody who mattered wanted to invest in the negotiations, the dividends were accordingly meagre.

With the process in such peril, what could a sometime BRN player like Hassan Thoyib do? Answer: Extricate himself fast, but without losing face or letting the failure look like his fault. Thus the five conditions, posted on YouTube for the whole world to see. It was clear enough that they were designed to be unacceptable to the Thai government.

Sure enough, Bangkok dismissed the conditions outright. Paradorn said Hassan had the right to post them on YouTube, but that was not the point. Hassan had returned the ball to Paradorn’s court, and in such a way as to ensure the latter would be left fuming.

The first condition was for Malaysia to switch from being merely a facilitator to a “mediator”. This seemed calculated to be rejected both by Bangkok, seasonally suspicious of Malaysia for harbouring ulterior motives across the border, and by Malaysia itself for encouraging such suspicions.

Second, Hassan and his clique wanted to monopolise the talks from the insurgents’ end. He insisted that only those from, or approved by, his faction of the BRN would be permitted to participate.

If those conditions proved insufficient to derail the talks, the third calling for observers from foreign NGOs or OIC or Asean countries would certainly do the trick. It not only did that but also upset the Thai government as well.

Fourth, Hassan wanted all charges against the rebels to be dropped, no new charges to be filed, and all captured detainees to be freed. And until a peace deal has been sealed, the insurgents would continue their violent attacks.

Fifth, Hassan wanted the Thai government to officially acknowledge that the rebels were freedom fighters of a liberation movement rather than insurgents. This would rub salt into the wound and guarantee that Bangkok would reject the conditions as a whole even if it accepted the other four.

This fifth condition also had the “benefit” of appeasing militants on the ground and their leadership, especially when they had not taken kindly to Hassan’s self-appointed role in representing them. But this would not contribute substantially, if at all, to the prospects of peace.

By now, few among rebel ranks were unaware of the real purpose of the talks: Thaksin sidling up to his most outstanding liability, management of the southernmost provinces, in paving the way to his political return. That further delegitimises the current round of talks and keeps all stakeholders well away from the process.

Does this mean no peace negotiations are possible? Not at all, since there are leaders of the BRN and Pulo (Pattani United Liberation Organisation), another rebel group, in favour of peace and genuine talks for achieving it.

One of the problems with the latest negotiations is that its cynical motives and subsequent weaknesses place all parties in a bad light. As a result, all future attempts at building peace become that much more difficult.

Even at the best of times, the BRN is too factionalised to limit talks to just one or two factions. Their leaders must also have enough of a handle on the militants, particularly the younger generation of rebels.

Like community activists everywhere they want peace, but it has to be a peace based on justice and meaningful reforms. So far they do not see much commitment from Bangkok.

The needed reforms would include effective elimination of poverty, anti-corruption measures, and a decentralisation of power to the provinces. Southern Thais would be among the first to know if such policies are real.

A rebel chief that Thai authorities have tried to invite for talks is Sapae-ing Basor, spiritual leader and former head of a religious school. But he has been reluctant to emerge, especially since no amnesty has been granted to him against capture.

With more attacks since, including killings in Pattani on May 1 and last Thursday, the need for peace becomes more urgent even if the incentive for talks remains in doubt.

> Bunn Nagara is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS).

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