Sunday January 27, 2013

History still being written

Behind The Headlines by BUNN NAGARA

IF a meteor struck the planet, it could cause such a massive impact as to dislocate life as we know it.

Depending on size and force, it may produce devastating geological and atmospheric convulsions. Affected seas may produce terrifying tsunamis.

Then a new order would emerge as the initial dust settles. But that order itself would remain subject to further change as other elements in the environment re-assert themselves.

There are equivalents of these phases in the political sphere.

In Egypt, the initial anti-Mubarak convulsions that began in Cairo’s Tahrir Square two years and two days ago today have since produced an Islamist government with an increasingly autocratic style.

That once-political tsunami itself is now undergoing change, as the country continues to move from an anti-Mubarak phase to a pro-democracy one. Few political leaders themselves recognise this transitional situation.

Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood’s President Mohamed Morsi are apt to dismiss any Opposition stand as pro-Mubarak residue, but there is more to it than that.

Such cynicism and myopia demean Egypt and Egyptians, offering no recognition of how the country’s politics is evolving.

Adding to the momentum of this evolution is none other than Morsi’s own manner in office. Once in power, he wrongly assumed that he could rule by decree, which he did.

That created a backlash that even now continues to build. When Morsi unilaterally suspended democratic checks on his power last year, it created a furore and more street demonstrations.

His action also triggered the formation of the National Salvation Front (NSF), a coalition of opposition parties comprising an assortment of ideologies all dedicated to defeating Morsi in office.

In essence, Morsi forgot three vital elements of his newfound presidency.

First, he had only chanced upon the presidency himself. The national mood at the time centring on Tahrir Square was anti-Mubarak, not pro-Morsi, in a field of other weaker presidential candidates.

Second, the groundswell against Mubarak had come as a reaction against his autocracy and venality. Yet Morsi swiftly assumed an autocratic mode, with venality possibly stretching to cover abuse of power.

For their part, post-Mubarak Egyptians had not turned en masse to Islamist theocracy itself, or only as a reaction against Mubarak.

Third, with Mubarak gone, Eyptians had tasted freedom and liked it. They were not about to trade the lack of democracy under Mubarak’s secular rule for a lack of democracy under Morsi’s Islamist rule.

This third Egyptian reality can only be ignored or neglected by any sitting government at its own peril. Morsi might have committed other strategic errors, but these three are enough to begin with or for him to end by.

Any reasonably perceptive politician would have discerned these issues and acted with more circumspection. The fact that Morsi did not shows his ineptitude, arrogance or both.

In an apparent spasm of righteous optimism, he moved his government closer to Islamic rule while rubbishing Constitutional safeguards and marginalising women and minorities. And so the President’s list of errors continues to grow.

An additional error was to mistake the original “Tahrir Square moment” for a grassroots call for Islamist rule, which it was not.

If Morsi had known the truth and only pretended that Egyptians wanted a theocracy, he will have to live with the consequences.

His evident unpopularity in recent months might have been reason for him to opt for ruling by decree. Of course, that did not help matters but only added to the misery and rejection of his leadership.

Two more errors concerned his sense of international propriety, or rather the lack of it. Morsi reportedly offended Israelis and upset major Western powers.

To do one may just be acceptable for that adrenaline rush, but two would be risky.

Morsi did both while insulting his fellow Egyptians, compatriots he had presumably joined in rallying on the streets against Mubarak only months before.

The result of his pains today is obvious and should have been predictable earlier: a political coalition uniting the otherwise disparate parties that are not in office, all of which have set aside their differences to concentrate on ousting Morsi.

The NSF feels it now has better chances at the polls in April than ever before. Ironically, the NSF’s very existence as well as its current optimism are due to Morsi himself.

The NSF comprises an otherwise unlikely mix of conservatives, liberals, radicals and nationalists who, despite their ideological differences, share the objective of stemming the Islamist tide.

Given the organisational skills of the Muslim Brotherhood still, it may not be as simple as it sounds.

However, there is no denying that Morsi and the Brotherhood have both been losing ground. Furthermore, chunks of that loss have been converting into support for the NSF.

The deficiencies of Morsi’s government are multiplied in a weak economic environment as public pain grows more acute.

Indeed, by focusing on its theological goal rather than on more mundane and worldly matters like the economy, the Islamists had exposed their vulnerability.

Popular disillusionment with Morsi’s leadership has also surfaced, from its inattention to broken infrastructure. Not only is his Islamism beset by such secular challenges, it is also unwittingly fuelling them with its distant, other-worldly aloofness.

At such a juncture in a country’s leadership, the natural next step is to ask about the most likely presidential candidate to replace or succeed Morsi.

For at least one year now, that candidate is the reputedly secular socialist Hamdeen Sabahy. Previously the leader of the Dignity Party and now of the Popular Current, Hamdeen is also informal leader of the NSF coalition.

His record, however, has been patchy. While deriding others of opportunistic populism, he campaigned in last year’s election by promising cash handouts if he won.

The people did not get those handouts. Now Hamdeen and colleagues are hyping their electoral moment in April, to the extent of claiming a small parliamentary majority by then.

For much of the time, Hamdeen’s candidacy would seem to be the stuff of dreams for Western policymakers itching to get stuck into Egyptian political affairs.

Here was a liberal alternative to Morsi who was not only a secular leader but also one who had pledged to roll back the Islamist advance in Egypt’s politics. But then came the catch.

Hamdeen is also a kind of nationalist, in fact a pan-Arab one, who idolises former president Gamal Nasser who sought to unite Arabs across the region.

This would be a nightmare for Israel, which prefers to keep its neighbours disunited and even squabbling.

Morsi may be an occasional loose cannon, but for the West and Israel, at least he keeps the barrel mostly pointing inwards within Egypt. Even in his Muslim Brotherhood (as former member) incarnation, there was little pretence at pan-regional leadership.

So just as Hamdeen seemed a viable candidate for a while, Morsi may yet sit comfortably in office.

Of course, Egyptian voters also matter in deciding who leads the country come election time, within the usual limits.

News

Sunday January 27, 2013

History still being written

Behind The Headlines by BUNN NAGARA