Sunday July 5, 2009

Repeating the mistakes of history

BEHIND THE HEADLINES WITH BUNN NAGARA

WHEN you’re down on your luck, the only way out may seem to be up. But that is illusory if you can sink further.

The illusion informs Nato’s current efforts in Afghanistan. US President Barack Obama is among those who feel that since the fight against the Afghan Taliban is failing, the solution must be to send in more troops.

It was a classic George W. Bush touch. Regardless of who is US president, that option is just as likely to lead to greater failure.

Three days ago 4,000 US Marines and 650 Afghan troops poured into southern Helmand Valley in the biggest escalation of fighting since the Taliban government fell in 2001. It was supposed to signal a major new commitment to defeating the Taliban resurgence, but realities dictate rather more modest goals.

As in Iraq, the conflict in Afghanistan that has seen the Taliban control more territory than President Hamid Karzai’s government in recent years requires a political solution besides military tactics. But so far, the political objectives have leapt from a failed attempt to woo “moderate” Taliban elements to investing in the Aug 20 election.

So when fresh US forces waded deeper into Helmand from Friday, they could realistically do little more than help secure the ground for a better election turnout in seven weeks. Yet even with such a limited objective, there are already problems.

It is generally thought that the larger the election turnout, the better the chances of Karzai’s re-election. But the realities beg to differ.

The latest reports indicate that people in Helmand, Afghanistan’s biggest province, are becoming disillusioned and not responding well to voter registration because the opposition parties are disorganised. This suggests they would vote only if they felt that would help unseat Karzai.

Credibility in doubt

After eight years, the Afghan president’s legacy mostly comes down to relying on his political credibility to carry on. And that itself is in doubt.

With still two months to go before the election, some provinces revealed more voters being “registered” than their known population. This is one “Iran situation” that an incumbent hungry for credibility cannot afford, particularly when government officials have been eager to get more voters registered.

The uncertainty of Helmand’s support for Karzai particularly spells his weakness. He belongs to the province’s Pashtun majority community, so if he loses in Helmand other provinces may feel he does not deserve their support either.

The new US commander for Afghanistan, Gen Stanley McChrystal, similarly offers new possibilities with little chance of success.

His main aim is not to eliminate more Taliban fighters but to regain lost territory. That confirms the primary objective as creating conditions for a credible election turnout, which is a short-term goal.

However, McChrystal also wants “development governance,” which requires winning the hearts and minds of local residents. That is a long-term goal, already loaded with two major obstacles.

Economically, Helmand has been producing half the world’s opium that provides the Taliban as much as US$12.5mil (RM44mil) a month, though not as much as what government officials get. Nato has tried to introduce wheat as a substitute cash crop, with very limited results.

Shifting to another crop is not easy for an impoverished nation already dependent on a “proven” produce: opium’s distribution channels are better established and the returns greater.

Politically, there is no new thinking besides the Bush-type military “surge”. This has meant more US attacks on rural communities and greater loss of civilian life, generating more local sympathy for the Taliban as the most credible resistance force.

One difference lies in simultaneous US-led attacks on targets in both Pakistan and Afghanistan in recent days. But this only raises the stakes by inflaming more Pakistani villagers as well, such that the enlarged strategy can backfire doubly.

Along the way, more appeals for funding from the two governments are likely to be met. The new funding will then disappear into black holes again, further eroding government credibility.

One natural result of the heavier firepower of recent days is a scuttling of Taliban forces. This has led to the occupation forces’ greatest weakness: complacency.

A common reaction in the West is to crow over this “victory” against the Taliban, as now, when Taliban fighters have only moved elsewhere to hide before they regroup.

That underlines the nature of a guerilla force and asymmetrical warfare, which deploying incompatible regular forces like the US Marines only serves to obscure.

Ultimate futility

The Taliban have successfully been retreating only to recharge themselves since 2001. That underscores the ultimate futility of the coming Afghan election without real political solutions, even if the election is a success.

Suppose US forces succeed in holding the ground for seven weeks for election registration and voting, and Hamid Karzai is returned as president.

Occupation forces are unlikely to hold all the ground for seven months, let alone seven years or more, for winning hearts and minds, “development governance” and all the good things promised.

US forces cannot do that for all of Afghanistan even with the 68,000-troop tally planned for later this year. The Taliban will simply bide their time for another resurgence, as they have been practising for eight years already.

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