Why Xi Jinping’s crusade against corruption in the military is far from over


Ten days into his first term as leader of China’s ruling Communist Party and its military, Xi Jinping promoted a new general.

It was November 2012, and Wei Fenghe was conferred with the new rank in a small ceremony at the military’s Bayi Building in Beijing.

Wei was commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, which oversaw the country’s nuclear arsenal at the time. State news agency Xinhua reported that Wei looked “orderly and in high spirits” and Xi had “shaken his hand warmly”.

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Xi Jinping (centre) poses for a photo with the newly promoted General Wei Fenghe (first left) and other high-ranking military officers after a ceremony in Beijing on November 23, 2012. Photo: Xinhua

A decade on, things could not be more different. After vanishing from public view last year, Wei – who was defence minister from 2018 to 2023 – has been expelled from the party, along with his successor Li Shangfu. In the announcement in June, Beijing accused both Wei and Li of bribery and political disloyalty.

The wording on Wei was especially harsh. It said he had “betrayed the trust of the party and the [Central Military Commission], seriously polluted the political environment of the military, and caused great damage to the party’s cause, national defence and military construction, as well as the image of its senior leaders”.

A number of top generals have been purged in Xi’s campaign to stamp out corruption in the world’s largest army. But Wei stands out as the only one accused of “being disloyal and losing one’s chastity” – odd wording that analysts say could suggest he was compromised by a hostile force.

Wei Fenghe was accused of “being disloyal and losing one’s chastity”. Photo: AP

It’s not over yet

The war on military corruption – now in its second decade – has brought down more generals than the number killed on 20th century battlefields. Beijing has declared an “overwhelming victory” in the fight against graft, while PLA generals have praised Xi’s command over the campaign as having “saved the military at a critical time”.

But there are many cases still unresolved – many of which involve military officers who were promoted when Xi was at the helm.

Analysts say the campaign is far from over, pointing to factors such as the rampant corruption in the military before Xi took over, the vast amount of money being spent on modernising weapons, and the “insular” culture of the PLA as the armed wing of the party.

Another corruption investigation of a senior officer, Sun Jinming, was announced at last month’s party conclave, the third plenum. Sun, who has also been expelled from the party, was chief of staff of the PLA Rocket Force overseeing the nuclear arsenal – formerly known as the Second Artillery Corps. At least eight past or serving senior officials from the Rocket Force have been placed under investigation for graft since last year.

Wu Guoguang, a senior fellow on Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Centre for China Analysis, said there could “still be a lot of people we don’t know about who are already under investigation” with more to come.

Sun Jinming, who is under investigation, was chief of staff of the PLA Rocket Force. Photo: Baidu

Speaking at a webinar in July, Wu pointed to Central Committee membership changes at its third plenum. He said PLA Rocket Force deputy political commissar Ding Xingnong – a non-voting alternate member – was not made a full member even though he was next in line under the party constitution based on his rank and number of votes from delegates.

Wu said that could indicate Ding “might also be involved in corruption”. He said political investigations under way in the military could be “larger and more serious” than what has been announced so far.

‘Bribes to climb the ranks’

Xi has meanwhile been rallying the top brass. In June, at a gathering in Yanan, Shaanxi – the party’s stronghold during the civil war – China’s leader called on hundreds of generals to uphold loyalty and eliminate “conditions that breed corruption”.

Weeks later, the PLA announced a full “rectification” – a process that would include “rectification of the mind, personnel appointments, organisation, working style and discipline”.

Analysts have pointed to the military’s “insular” culture as a problem.

That stems from the PLA having its own system of graft fighters, auditors, prosecutors and courts, and it could be part of what is at the root of corruption within the military, according to Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

“The PLA has always particularly struggled with corruption because it is a somewhat unique and insular pillar of the party system,” he said. “There are also intense incentives within the PLA to use bribes to climb the ranks.”

Hart said corruption remained a major obstacle for Xi’s ambitions to strengthen the military, and it could threaten the PLA’s combat readiness.

Guo Boxiong (left) and the late Xu Caihou were members of the Politburo and CMC vice-chairmen. Photos: Handout

In Xi’s early days of fighting military corruption, the biggest scalps – Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, former members of the Politburo and vice-chairmen of the CMC – were both accused of taking bribes in exchange for helping others get promoted. Xu died from cancer in 2015 while awaiting trial. Guo was jailed for life the following year.

A 2015 report in the government-run China Youth Daily on corruption in the military said promotions were being bought, with the cost determined by rank. One army commander said he had given Xu 20 million yuan (US$2.77 million) in bribes to secure a promotion, according to the report.

It also raised concerns over leadership roles being given to people who did not have the experience to command, and over funds being wasted and not being used to buy advanced weapons or maintain the armed forces, potentially affecting the PLA’s combat readiness.

“If we don’t crack down on these corruption cases, what will our military become?” Luo Yuan, a retired major general, was quoted as saying.

This is not an issue that Xi can simply solve with a few purges – it takes time to make deep, lasting change
Brian Hart, CSIS China Power Project

Hart noted that Xi has significant political leeway to name the people he wants for key positions, but it is still limited to the high-ranking officers who have climbed through the system.

“Since corruption has long been endemic to that system, some of the people Xi selects will be tainted by corruption,” he said. “This is not an issue that Xi can simply solve with a few purges – it takes time to make deep, lasting change to sprawling bureaucracies like this.”

Rapid build-up

In the June announcement, former defence chief Li was accused of taking but also offering bribes, which analysts say could suggest he tried to bribe someone more senior in the military.

Li was removed as defence minister in October, two months after he was last seen in public and having been in the job for just seven months. An engineer who spent decades working at a satellite and rocket launch centre, Li had then worked in the military’s equipment development unit. The June announcement also alleged that he had “polluted” that sector.

Former defence chief Li Shangfu is accused of taking and offering bribes. Photo: EPA-EFE

It came after nine PLA generals, some from the Rocket Force, were ousted from the national legislative body in December, and three senior aerospace and defence executives were removed from the party’s top political advisory body.

Hart said the speed of military modernisation was likely to have created more opportunities and incentives for officers to engage in graft.

“When you build up your forces at such a rapid pace, there is bound to be corruption – especially in areas related to equipment procurement,” he said. “That is an area that has been a key target of recent high-profile corruption scandals.”

China’s annual military budgets have remained around the same level in recent years as it tries to catch up with the United States, even as the rest of the party-state system is tightening belts amid an economic slowdown.

Military spending is set to increase by 7.2 per cent this year to 1.69 trillion yuan – the same rate of increase as 2023, but higher than this year’s economic growth target of 5 per cent.

Zeng Zhiping, a Jiangsu-based lawyer and expert on military law, said the PLA’s governance should be integrated into the framework of the national legal system so that there is outside evaluation.

“Sunlight is the best drug against corruption,” he said, adding that only a small part of the military needs to be kept top secret.

“If the public can see you, it naturally restricts your actions,” Zeng said. “There has to be transparency instead of it being so tightly guarded.”

A tighter grip?

While some analysts have pointed to the purges and corruption scandals in recent years as a sign of weakness in the military and Xi’s control, others say he is in a stronger position than previous leaders.

Xi was determined to shake up the armed forces after seeing his predecessor Hu Jintao being treated as a figurehead by his deputies in the CMC, the South China Morning Post has reported previously, citing military sources.

One example was the PLA conducting a surprise test flight of its first stealth fighter jet, the J-20, during a trip to Beijing by then US defence chief Robert Gates in 2011. Gates saw that Hu was as stunned by the news as he was, and it was seen by US military officials as a sign of Hu’s weak control over the PLA.

Xi’s grip on the military has been much tighter, according to James Char, a research fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

“Xi Jinping’s control over the PLA is stronger than that of any of his predecessors (even Mao Zedong) if we look at the reforms he has been able to effect throughout the PLA since late 2015,” he said.

Those reforms have changed the whole command structure of the military, ending decades of dominance by the army.

Char also noted Xi’s move to reduce the number of members on the Central Military Commission from 11 to seven.

“The latest personnel purges should not be mistaken as a sign of weakness on the part of the CMC chairman,” Char said.

But he said structural problems behind corruption in the military remained.

“The phenomenon of military malfeasance is unlikely to go away as long as China remains a party-state and in the absence of fully developed external checks and balances on the PLA,” he said.

Additional reporting by Hayley Wong

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