A member of the Philippine Coast Guard personnel salutes as a Vietnamese Coastguard ship during a joint maritime exercise in the disputed South China Sea on Aug 9. - AFP File
MANILA (SCMP): The Philippines’ involvement in a maritime dispute between Vietnam and China reflects a strategy to form alliances in the South China Sea, according to observers who believe that Manila is hoping Hanoi would “return the favour”.
However, they also note that while Vietnam may appreciate the gesture, it is unlikely to change its approach to the disputed waterway.
Last Friday, the Philippines condemned China’s alleged assault of Vietnamese fishermen in the South China Sea, where Manila and Beijing are also locked in numerous confrontations that have sparked concerns of armed conflict.
Manila’s National Security Council said it was standing with Vietnam, denouncing what it called “violent and illegal actions of Chinese maritime authorities against Vietnamese fishermen” near the Paracel Islands on Sept 29.
Vietnam has accused Chinese law enforcement of beating 10 fishermen with iron bars and taking away thousands of dollars’ worth of fish and equipment.
China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, despite overlapping maritime claims by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Le Hong Hiep, a senior fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme of the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute said Manila’s denouncement of China’s actions is seen as a strategy to build a coalition with Vietnam in the South China Sea, even though the Philippines is not directly involved in the Paracel’s dispute.
“It also reflects Manila’s concern that what happens to Vietnam’s fishermen today can also happen to Filipino fishermen tomorrow.”
Although Vietnam appreciates the Philippines’ support, it is unlikely Manila’s actions will influence Hanoi’s strategy in the South China Sea, Hiep said, noting that Vietnamese leaders prioritise peace and stability in the disputed waterway to facilitate domestic economic development.
Adding that Vietnam prefers to handle incidents in the South China Sea, especially minor ones, “quietly and prudently” Hiep said, and is cautious about openly confronting China with the support of the Philippines and the United States.
“From Hanoi’s view, this may backfire and harm its overall South China Sea and China strategies,” Hiep said.
This week, the armed forces of the Philippines, the US and four other countries – began joint naval exercises off the coast of the Philippines’ northern Luzon island facing Taiwan.
Additionally, President Ferdinand Marcos, Jnr has allowed US forces and weapons access to four additional Philippine military bases, bringing the total to nine under a 2014 agreement.
Bill Hayton, associate fellow at the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, a London-based think tank, said the Philippines has been facing intimidation from China regarding its resupply missions to soldiers at the Second Thomas Shoal, with little support from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).
“Manila is hoping that its own public support for Vietnam will increase the chances of Hanoi returning the favour and speaking out in support of the Philippines”.
Hayton believes that is unlikely to happen, adding that the two Southeast Asian neighbours may collaborate to press Asean to maintain a firm stance on the South China Sea, potentially with the silent support of Indonesia and Malaysia.
In June, Asean secretary general Kao Kim Hourn said the bloc will accelerate negotiations with China on a code of conduct to reduce the risk of conflicts in the South China Sea, hoping to conclude talks by 2026.
South-East Asian leaders will meet in Laos this week, where the South China Sea, and the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, will be among the most pressing issues.
In addition, last month, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said that Malaysia will not yield to China’s demands to halt its oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea, as the activities fall within Malaysian waters.
While Indonesia is not a claimant in the South China Sea, its exclusive economic zone in the North Natuna Sea falls within China’s so-called nine-dash line, which Beijing uses to claim around 90 per cent of the disputed waters.
Skirmishes have occurred several times in recent years, including in December 2022, when China sent coastguard 5901, the world’s largest coastguard vessel, to patrol the North Natuna Sea.
While Vietnam has been “largely quiet”, Hayton said Hanoi’s strong response to the Sept 29 incident could be attributed to the recent change in leadership in the country, referring to Vietnam’s top security official To Lam who was confirmed as president in May and Communist Party chief in August.
Prashanth Parameswaran, fellow at the Wilson Center and founder of the Asean Wonk newsletter, said Vietnam’s usually low profile responses are “critical” to prevent China from “normalising destabilising behaviour in the South China Sea that comes at a cost to countries and their people”.
He added that when rival South-East Asian claimant states support each other, they can “reduce their asymmetry with China and undermine Beijing’s divide and conquer tactics” in the South China Sea.
“Sustaining this kind of South China Sea solidarity is a challenge that policymakers on both sides recognise given the convergences and divergences in their own interests, capabilities and approaches,” he added.
In an article published on Saturday by China’s nationalistic tabloid The Global Times, the daily accused the Philippines of using Vietnam’s incident as an opportunity “to hype its own claims in the South China Sea and draw Vietnam to its side against China.”
Citing Chinese experts, the daily said Manila is “driven by a desire to stir up trouble” and has been “stigmatising” China’s law enforcement as “violent and illegal”. - South China Morning Post
