Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto at a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Nov 9, 2024. - Reuters
JAKARTA: President Prabowo Subianto is a realistic general who faces reality bravely, without pretense or mere talk, and he has proved this in the recent bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
This holds especially true in the ninth of the two leaders’ 14-point joint statement, a point that has attracted the attention of many, if not sparked a debate. It emphasizes the need for both sides to create more bright spots in their maritime cooperation.
Point 9 specifically relates to China’s claim over the South China Sea (SCS), which overlaps Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea, and the two countries reached an important understanding of joint development in areas with overlapping claims.
Indonesia and China agreed to establish an intergovernmental joint steering committee to explore and advance relevant cooperation based on the principles of "mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit, flexibility, pragmatism and consensus", in line with their respective laws and regulations.
Both sides also affirmed that this cooperation remained within the context and concept formulated with Asean countries, known as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), which are based on consensus building in maintaining peace and stability in the SCS.
The 10th point in the joint statement indicates that both parties will build a new pillar of bilateral defence and security cooperation.
The previous strategic cooperation between China and Indonesia covered the four pillars of economic and trade cooperation, social and cultural cooperation, maritime cooperation and infrastructure and connectivity cooperation.
The fifth pillar of defense and security cooperation represents an expansion of the 2007 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) into a more holistic, integrated agreement.
This fifth pillar includes four detailed aspects: broader development cooperation, including counterterrorism and transnational crime; military and civil cooperation, including capacity building for security institutions; joint exercises, including for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and maritime security, including maritime safety efforts and combating crimes at sea.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) recognises five types of waters: territorial seas, EEZs, high seas, contiguous zones and internal waters.
Full sovereignty of a state over its waters is limited to internal waters and territorial seas up to 12 nautical miles (22km) from its baselines. In the contiguous zone spanning up to 24 nautical miles, a state can enforce its laws related to customs, immigration and security.
In EEZs, which are limited to within 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline, states have exclusive rights to explore and exploit resources, known as sovereign rights.
The high seas are beyond national jurisdiction. Unclos differentiates coastal states and archipelagic states. Only five archipelagic states are recognised by Unclos: the Bahamas, Fiji, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines.
A total of 15 countries do not recognise Unclos, although they follow the principles of maritime law regulated by the convention.
One of these is the United States, which refuses to ratify the convention, primarily due to concerns that Unclos would reduce its freedom to conduct seabed mining operations and navigation in the high seas and its lack of confidence in the UN’s role in managing global marine resources.
On May 7, 2009, China submitted note number CML/17/2009 to the UN, asserting its indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea, including its jurisdiction and sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil. The note included a map with a dotted line known as the nine-dash line, covering approximately 3.5 million square kilometers (sq km).
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague declared in 2016 that China's claims over the SCS based on the nine-dash line had no legal basis.
However, China continues to maintain its claims and although they were deemed illegitimate under international law, this does not mean China loses its claim rights. At least six countries have claims over parts of the SCS: China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
As explained, EEZs are not a sovereign area of a state. When there is an overlap of claims in an EEZ, the resolution mechanism involves diplomacy and law.
Some methods include bilateral or multilateral negotiations, joint development agreements (JDAs), arbitration or international courts, international mediation or Unclos mechanisms.
Several countries adopt the JDA approach in overlapping areas, as Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam have in the Gulf of Thailand.
In the Southern Hemisphere, Australia and Timor-Leste also applied this approach in the Timor Sea Treaty.
Indonesia has an EEZ spanning around 83,000sq km in the South China Sea, of which approximately 35,000sq km overlaps with China's claims, but it is not among the countries contesting claims in the South China Sea.
Historically, Indonesia's approach has been symbolic. In the case of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, he visited the SCS, renamed it the North Natuna Sea and affirmed that the PCA and Unclos 1982 did not recognise China's claims over that waterway.
This approach is like keeping the fire under ashes, psychologically hindering broader and more productive cooperation.
His successor President Prabowo has taken a different approach. The joint statement from Prabowo and Xi on the bilateral development plan in the SCS holds strategic significance, as it includes joint resource management, increased investment, technology transfer and capacity building in the maritime and fisheries industries, and hence contribute to regional stability.
For China, this is also an important signal to other major countries like the US, whose strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific is viewed as intervening in China's front yard.
The Indonesia-China JDA, which is based on principles of mutual respect, equality and benefit, as well as flexibility, pragmatism, consensus and recognition of international law, ensures that the sovereign rights of neither country are sacrificed.
Many might criticise or simply be confused by Prabowo’s move. But to reiterate, he has shown that he is a general who bravely faces reality without pretense or mere talk. - The Jakarta Post/ANN
*** The writer is an alumnus of the Indonesian Defense University, a geostrategic energy expert and a former adviser to the energy and mineral resources minister (2019-2023).
