Cui Hongjian is a leading Chinese researcher on European studies. A former diplomat, he is the head of European Union studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Talking to the South China Morning Post, Cui delves into the changing dynamics of China-EU relations and the impact of a strong comeback by Donald Trump, the US president-elect.
What are the main challenges facing China’s relations with the European Union? Are they different from previous decades and, if so, why?
The fundamentals that define China-EU relations have changed in recent years. The gap in perception of each other is deeper, which has also dealt a blow to academic exchanges.
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China’s stance of a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU – that views cooperation as greater than competition and consensus as greater than differences – has been rejected by the EU.
India, Africa and Latin America – but not China – have been listed by the European Union as its next-generation strategic partnerships.
In the EU’s view, its triple positioning on China – as a cooperative partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival – is based on reality and objectively reflects the status and trajectory of Europe’s policy logic towards China.
Meanwhile, China is still focused on the expectations of a bilateral relationship.
There has also been a shift in power dynamics. China has become stronger and more influential while Europe feels it is in a decline.
Europe has always been anxious about competitiveness. In the past, it was the US and Japan that Brussels was worried about but in recent years, it has been taking China’s role into account.
The EU’s anxiety has so far remained focused on economic and technological competitiveness, but risks are mounting that the anxiety might exacerbate to the strategic level, including institutional competition.
What changes does China need to make?
China needs to improve and update its own perception of Europe. We cannot remain in the past. We used to focus on the economic aspect but neglected exchanges in the areas of security and geopolitics.
We also used to say that China and Europe do not share historical legacy issues nor geopolitical conflicts, which are two fundamental premises for formulating policies for bilateral relations. But these two premises have been weakened in recent years.
Both sides share different or even contrasting perceptions of history. From our perspective, the history of China’s entry into modernisation was a period of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, while many Europeans view it as the conquest of civilisation over barbarism – a notion that is deeply rooted in Europe.
Correspondingly, there is a clear and significant cognitive difference between China and the EU on the question of whether China is still a developing country or has become a developed economy.
We also need to go beyond conventional notions of geopolitical conflict.
China and Europe don’t have territorial conflicts that require military tools as a solution, but they have indeed had conflicts in cyberspace, with some mentioning a Chinese threat on the cyber front. It is a new geopolitical conflict.
China’s relations with Russia, such as joint military drills in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, have raised concerns in the EU. Germany, France and the Netherlands have conducted naval ship transits through the Taiwan Strait in recent years.
The differences in security concepts between the two sides have the potential to evolve into real security differences and risks.
Those developments indicate that we cannot ignore the geopolitical factor in bilateral relations. We need to find a new fundamental positioning and logic for the bilateral relationship. We hope to find a path to enter the next phase as soon as possible.
I believe that these dramatic changes will also be strongly felt by policymakers and policy implementers on both sides. The contradictions and conflicts that arise between the policy logics and the realities of the relationship need to be resolved to achieve a rebalancing. They may have to re-evaluate their work to reflect the changing circumstances, and in turn to reconsider policies and strategies.
There is a huge contrast between strategic judgment and practice. Over the years, the focus of both parties has been to update the top-level design, but from now on more attention needs to be paid to the underlying logic that can support it. Top-level design is a macro-level approach, while it also requires feedback, revisions and improvements based on practice.
Trump stormed to victory in the US presidential election. Will China have to fight a trade war on two fronts and will the EU choose a side?
The situation might be complicated, as we may face a triad game.
The European Union will try to find common ground with the United States to deal with China, but Trump may not necessarily buy into this approach. One major issue is that Europe has little influence over Trump.
If Trump imposes tariffs both on China and the EU, the EU may try to influence Trump’s team and divert the target to China by blaming China’s overcapacity, just like it did in Trump’s first term on steel and aluminium tariffs.
But it may not work as Trump has voiced his dissatisfaction on US imports of European cars.
The EU and the US set up three dialogue mechanisms – the Trade and Technology Council (TCC), as well as bilateral dialogues on China and the Indo-Pacific – to coordinate their policies against China.
The EU is now in touch with Trump’s transition team. First, Brussels expects Trump’s team to agree on negotiations to solve the tariff issues, hoping the new administration will continue with the TCC and other talks.
But it has also prepared for retaliation measures if Trump insists on imposing tariffs. By doing so, it could send a strong message to Trump that it would be a lose-lose game which might ultimately benefit China.
The current relationship between China, the US and Europe is not as simple as we might think. Some people might think that if Trump treats Europe poorly, Europe might then lean towards China. But it’s not that simple.
Although its current capabilities are limited, the EU’S ultimate goal is not to swing back and forth between China and the US. The EU wants to find its own baseline, to build up its capacity to support its ambition of “strategic autonomy”.
It is not easy to do so over the short term, and that is why it has taken a de-risking tactic towards Trump’s USA.
In the past, the EU built its strength based on coordination with other countries, such as with Russia in energy, with China in the economy and the US in security, which can be summarised as the global diversification of resources.
Now it has realised all those are not reliable, even its judgment about “over-reliance on the Chinese market” does not seem true in China.
But the EU has not reached a consensus yet, especially on strategic autonomy. It aims to become the third power between China and the USA but this path is a long one, and many issues in the middle are not yet clear, yet time is running out.
Compared with the situation of Trump’s first term, the EU is likely to face more weakness in security.
The strategy that Trump may employ is to link economic issues with security, using them as leverage against Europe. This approach would be very difficult for Europe to navigate, as they could be caught in a complicated set of interdependent issues where concessions in one area could lead to demands in another.
How can China better cope with the situation?
China and the EU must prepare for the worst-case scenario in Trump’s second term. Both sides will closely monitor each other’s moves at the beginning.
For instance, how China plans to respond and counteract will be of great interest to Europe, and vice versa. China should also watch out for the extent to which the US and Europe reach agreement on certain issues.
There may be areas where cooperation between China and Europe is possible, but it is very unrealistic to think that Europe will take a side between China and the US. Meanwhile, it is not realistic to assess US-EU relations without taking into account China’s influence.
Brussels and Beijing exchanged tit-for-tat sanctions in 2021. They discussed possibilities to remove them but the talks ended in a stalemate on who should take the main responsibility.
We hope the new European institutions may offer an opportunity for a change. And Trump’s tariff policy may add more urgency for both sides to remove obstacles to meaningful discussion on the issue of sanctions, to open up prospects for cooperation.
What might be the outlook for the Ukraine war and how does it affect China?
The conflict has caused spillovers on China. Beijing is under huge diplomatic pressure from the EU, while Russia may not be completely satisfied with China’s stand.
On the economic front, Europe is increasingly treating China as a de facto ally of Russia’s, which means it is not just a matter of making money or not with China, but whether it is still worth collaborating with Beijing.
For Europe, the logic is straightforward: it should not be “blackmailed” by Russia on energy reliance, nor by China on markets.
The EU has undertaken measures to reduce economic dependency on China. There are also calls in the US, including from some Republicans, to work with Russia to counter China. Such possibilities should not be completely ruled out.
If the conflict comes to an end quickly, China would still face challenges controlling the spillover impact. How the conflict ends will be decided by how Russia and the US manage their relations. No matter which way it ends, it will directly affect China.
Given current US-China tensions, a change in Russia-US relations will inevitably affect the mutual trust between Beijing and Moscow.
Beijing also needs to consider possible reactions from the EU and Ukraine, such as whether they would place more expectations on China to influence Moscow. At least at the moment, some Europeans think China holds the key to solving the conflict, believing that Beijing should be able to influence Russian President Vladimir Putin.
No matter whether the conflict gets a quick resolution as Trump promised, or becomes more complicated, China-European relations will face further headwinds in political trust and economic cooperation.
Putin may have underestimated the reactions from Western countries, including German resolve to cut energy reliance on Russia, and did not expect Finland’s swift joining of Nato, while Europe mistakenly thought sanctions would crush Russia.
Looking east, Russia is also adjusting its strategic planning, such as promoting its relations with Mongolia, North Korea and India. This may complicate the geopolitical situation in China’s neighbourhood.
Russia and North Korea have moved closer recently, which would not only influence Pyongyang’s mindset in managing ties with China, but also might lead to subtle changes, like a chain reaction, in South Korea and Japan on how they view their security environment and China’s security role in the region.
There is also a misconception among the Chinese public. Some Chinese support Russia, not because they understand Russia but out of the shared need to counter the US. But somehow, it is a simplified thought. Just because China and Russia are facing the United States together does not mean that China and Russia are allies already.
The US-Russia conflicts vary greatly from China-US conflicts. For example, Russia has been expelled from the Swift interbanking system and therefore wants to set up its own currency settlement system, but China does not share the same interests, as its major trading partners are the United States and the EU.
What is your take on China’s relations with Nato?
We need to bring more nuance to our understanding of Nato. On the one hand, it has indeed been used as a tool for great power rivalry by the US. On the other, it also reflects to some extent the security demands and desire for protection of smaller European countries. We need to find a balance in assessing our relations with Nato.
China’s position, I think, is that it opposes Nato being leveraged by individual countries as a tool for power plays, but it does not have a general opposition to the membership of some European countries. For example, Finland’s accession to Nato does not affect its bilateral relations with China.
We need to distinguish different issues when dealing with Nato. In addition, Nato may face an existential crisis in Trump’s second term.
Will Nato deliberately say something to cater to Trump – just like European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen who, immediately after his victory, said the EU was willing to buy more energy products from the US? We need to wait and see.
So at the current stage, facing a mix of truth and falsehood, reality and pretence, we need to make good judgments, realise the complications of Nato itself and refrain from oversimplifying issues.
Nato has also tried to reduce the impact of Trump and to strengthen its European dimension – to turn itself into a security grouping for Europe would be a reasonable reaction towards possible pressure from Trump.
Meanwhile, Nato has also seen growing internal conflicts over strategic interests in recent years. For example, there have been debates within Nato over whether it should follow the US to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Not all members are willing or capable of going to the Indo-Pacific.
We should be keenly aware that Nato is becoming more Europeanised and the trend may gather pace if Trump continues his previous policies against Europe.
At this juncture, we need a new perspective on Nato. To some extent, we must acknowledge that it has a certain rationality in addressing the security concerns of smaller nations, but it cannot continue down the path of becoming a tool for great power competition.
China and Nato have maintained engagement. There is a dialogue mechanism in place. I think China needs to convey a message that what suits Nato does not necessarily suit Asia.
It is unlikely and unrealistic that Nato will have new members from Asia and the Pacific, but it is indeed forging closer security relations with some Asian countries.
These relations are likely to be strengthened based on two conditions: a consensus among regional countries that China is a security threat to the region, as well as China’s handling of regional hotspot issues, such as with the Philippines and Japan, and the issue over Taiwan.
The US is now trying to draw the Asia-Pacific into a bloc confrontation over the issue of Taiwan, and may forge a security alliance in the region to counter Beijing.
China should be clear about the risks. China has bilateral security arrangements but lacks a multilateral security arrangement in the region. The changing dynamics require China to take some constructive moves, or to find a framework to resolve issues with India, Japan, the Philippines and even potential issues with other regional players.
Will we see more confrontation over the issues of Taiwan and the South China Sea?
The EU and the US share the notion that countries should abide by “the rules-based order” and have criticised China for violating such an order.
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization [in 2001] kicked off the best time in its relations with the West. But from 2008, the West’s mindset changed to the view that China was showing signs of being “assertive” and “not accepting rules”.
China’s refusal to accept The Hague tribunal’s ruling on the South China Sea in 2016 further changed the EU’s perception of China. Now its view is that China not only refuses the current order, but also tries to establish new orders based on its own rules.
The EU, however, has fewer policy levers against China. The Taiwan issue is something it views as capable of containing China. It is becoming more complicated in China-EU relations.
Beijing has also adjusted its policy focus over the Taiwan issue in recent years and the EU is concerned that Beijing might have given up peaceful measures in seeking unification.
This concern pushes European powers to increase their presence in the sensitive waters, such as more naval transits through the Taiwan Strait. In China’s view, the EU’s actions are a game of marginality between “upholding freedom of navigation rules” and “exerting diplomatic pressure”.
Europe has also paid more attention to the Taiwan issue out of concerns over disruption to the semiconductor supply chain in case of military conflict. It has even tried to persuade Taiwan to move factories from the island to the European continent.
In addition, both the EU and some of its members have continued to challenge Beijing’s one-China principle with their “one-China policy” that they can define at will. They are expanding their relations with Taiwan, such as official visits and economic talks, while testing the boundary of Beijing’s tolerance – whether such moves may or may not fuel strong opposition or retaliation from Beijing.
The US has also attempted to make Taiwan the Ukraine of the East in its strategic constraints on China. What policy Trump will implement over the issue of Taiwan will also affect Europeans’ approach.
So it may require Beijing to rethink its policies: clarify and add specific requirements to the one-China principle, discuss and be clear with its European counterparts what is permissible and what is not under the one-China principle.
This cannot be just a game of words, but has to be implemented in practice. Otherwise, the one-China principle will be consistently hollowed out.
China has always deemed the Taiwan issue as part of its internal affairs. It should rethink whether there are other options, apart from military ones, to ensure security across the strait.
On the South China Sea disputes between China and neighbouring countries, the EU has actually over-read the situation.
China, including its researchers, need to tell their European counterparts that the South China Sea tribunal is just an individual case and China’s rejection of the tribunal ruling does not mean a blanket rejection of all international rules. The EU should not use it as a pretext in its judgment.
It requires a lot of work on clarification and explanation, and China is also open to discussion on the rules-based order. Both sides also have to shake off political influence that has weighed in too much recently on many issues and squeezed room for meaningful exchanges at all levels.
Without substantial exchanges, tit-for-tat policy responses to each other will only lead to a downward spiral in relations.
Are we going to see more headwinds in bilateral relations? Who will become a bigger concern for Europe – China or Russia?
China has never encountered such a complex situation before. In the past, China cooperated with major members to influence EU policies, and economic cooperation used to be the starting point to push forward engagement on other areas, such as political and cultural exchanges.
But it is time to rethink whether that approach still works.
Looking ahead, China needs to find areas for cooperation based on the different needs of these countries. The paradox is that while you cooperate with one country on one issue, you can be in a competition with it in another sector.
Take France as an example. China and France have stepped up strategic cooperation but are in conflict about electric vehicles.
The EU has also considered adjusting weightings in its triple positioning on China – as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival.
It used to put equal weightings on each of the three, while the reality is that in an ever-changing international environment, countries will inevitably face more competition and confrontation rather than cooperation.
For example on climate change, cooperation must outweigh competition at the macro level, but there has to be competition in the industrial sectors, such as we are facing now in the electric vehicle market.
We should also say no to the simplified notion that the China-European relationship is subordinate to Sino-American ties. The European Union is playing a vital role in the new bloc confrontation.
We need to brace for the notion of “endogenous momentum”, which means to discover how much benefit economic interaction and trade will bring to both sides, and to what extent these benefits are irreplaceable.
Same with the security issue, especially to find shared responsibilities on Ukraine, the Middle East or some other regional conflicts. It means we can find common ground on what both sides want to avoid, such as opposition to the use of nuclear weapons.
There is a negative perception of China in Europe. It is a belief that Russia is in decline and is a short-term threat, but that China represents a long-term comprehensive challenge.
What can China learn from the Ukraine war?
First and foremost, we need to update our mindset. The intense way in which great power rivalry is unfolding has, to a certain extent, caught us off guard.
We also need to enhance our strategic response abilities. It is about how quickly we can form a complete set of strategic thinking and cognition in response to unexpected events, and how we can make sufficient reactions in the short term.
On this aspect, I think there is a lot we can learn from the US. We should look at how the US reacts throughout the development of a big event. For example, how does it incorporate unexpected events into its existing strategic goal system?
For the US, the first issue that arises is whether to prioritise Europe or the Asia-Pacific region. It quickly came up with a response: China is a long-term comprehensive challenge and Russia is a short-term direct threat. This differentiation determines how it allocates its strategic capabilities.
Third, the competition between major powers is ultimately about controlling the situation. What is the real relationship between the US and Russia? Who can control the development of the situation, and who can make the situation go in the direction they hope for? That’s the most important thing we need to observe.
Russia has refrained from mobilising the whole nation or using nuclear weapons. The US has said it won’t send soldiers, even though it has the ability. It’s all about preventing the situation from spiralling out of their control.
If we assume China might face similar issues in the future, such as in the Taiwan Strait, how should it prepare? Some researchers have warned that the US is setting traps or exerting pressure on China to escalate tensions there. And inevitably it is aiming to narrow China’s options on the issue.
How to accurately identify and avoid falling into the strategic traps set by others – and how to adopt a systematic rather than a singular approach to deal with complex challenges, including the Taiwan issue – will be something that China needs to continue to learn and practise in future.
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