The government needs to allocate a minimum 4% of GDP for military spending over the next decade or so to even get to a minimum level of deterrence capability that goes beyond dealing with low-level intensity threats on land, sea, air and cyberspace. — Photo: Bernama
LAST October, a well-known defence and security analyst, Professor Datuk Dr Hamzah Ahmad or better known as BA Hamzah, wrote a scathing article in an online news blog on the state of the Malaysian military, which he noted is South-East Asia’s weakest in terms of readiness, and in his words, “no longer a potent force even in managing low-level intensity conflict” following years of political interference in procurement spending, corruption and poor planning.
As a maritime nation with porous coasts, Malaysia needs modern equipment for its navy and air force to ensure security of the country’s territorial waters as well as enforce rights over natural resources of the wider exclusive economic zone beyond the immediate territorial sea.
These rights have been tested more often today than before, especially by China, which is building up its own blue-water navy, besides staking claims in the South China Sea amid overlapping claims from other South-East Asian nations and Taiwan.
Quite how the government will continue to invest in defence and security needs under the Defence White Paper (DWP) published in 2019 without any actual figure being stated is interesting, although there is acknowledgement that defence spending is long-term and lasts beyond the allocations of a five-year Malaysia Plan (MP).
What the DWP really reveals is the government’s commitment to trimming the national debt, which will have to be balanced with defence spending aims that are long-term and stable, as well as affordable and sustainable.
With Budget 2024, Malaysia’s military will get some but not all of what it wants, as the government runs a tight budget focused on uplifting the socio-economic well-being of citizens while trying to ensure fiscal discipline as it aims to narrow the deficit to 4.3% of GDP by end-2024 (from 5%) and hit the 3% to 3.5% deficit target by the end of 2025. The allocation for military spending, at RM19.7bil, is RM2bil or 11.2% more than in Budget 2023 but when broken down, seems to be far short of what should be allocated.
For one thing, while the absolute amount is more, in percentage terms it is flat. Military spending under Budget 2024 is approximately 1% of GDP compared to 0.98% of GDP under Budget 2023.
For context, former chief of navy Admiral Tan Sri Mohd Reza Mohd Sany says the government should raise defence spending as a percentage of GDP from 1% to 1.5% to ensure that the armed forces can prepare and adapt to the region’s changing security scenario. The 12th MP calls for RM55bil in military procurement (excluding operational expenditure) but only RM14.7bil has been allocated so far, including under Budget 2024.
The reality is that, due to budget constraints, Malaysia’s military will continue to struggle to procure the equipment needed.
The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) released a strategy document in November 2018, the #15to5 Transformation Programme, detailing how the navy “will be able to deliver better results at optimal cost while adapting to future challenges and needs”. The strategy calls for a 55-ship fleet comprising four submarines, 12 littoral combat ships, three multi-role support ships, 18 offshore patrol vessels and 18 large patrol craft.
Tellingly, Adm Reza says in an interview with The Star back in October 2022 that the RMN had 16 combat ships of various sizes but “this has dwindled significantly given that the majority of the ships have lost their combat capabilities due to deterioration of equipment and weapons systems”. He noted that priority was always given to addressing the poor condition of current military assets compared to acquiring and developing new ones, while spending priorities were dictated by financial constraints.
A similar situation confronts the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), which published its Capability Development 2055 (CAP 55) strategic plan in mid-2018. While the government will be acquiring 18 South Korean-made FA-50 fighter jets to replace part of the air force’s ageing fleet, the first of these fighter jets will not be here until October 2026, with the last to be handed over in late 2027. The RMAF is underequipped, having retired all its MiG-29 and F5-E Tiger II fighter jets since 2017.
CAP-55 envisions two multirole combat aircraft squadrons and three light combat aircraft squadrons, with defence analysts estimating that a total of around 100 aircraft will comprise these squadrons. There will also be one strategic airlift and two tactical airlift squadrons, as well as two helicopter squadrons. To streamline costs and operations, the types of aircraft for all roles have been reduced to a maximum of two per role under CAP-55.
BA Hamzah, in the same online article, says the government needs to allocate a minimum 4% of GDP for military spending over the next decade or so to even get to a minimum level of deterrence capability that goes beyond dealing with low-level intensity threats on land, sea, air and cyberspace. This is the ideal and is unlikely given the historic military spending and the country’s current economic prospects.
This article first appeared in Star Biz7 weekly edition.
