THE global focus on the climate crisis has intensified, particularly with the United Nations holding the annual climate change conference (COP29) in the Azerbaijan capital of Baku.
However, COP29, like many prior COPs, has failed to adequately address the intersection of corruption and the climate crisis, or to explicitly recognise the dangers posed by their combination.
The absence of discourse on this intersection during the conferences has resulted in a paucity of follow-up discussions. This represents a missed opportunity, as such discussions are crucial for achieving more effective climate action outcomes.
To gain a deeper comprehension of the matter, one needs to discern the two distinct forms of corruption that are intertwined with the climate crisis.
The first type of corruption is criminal in nature, which is governed under Anti-Corruption Law No. 19/2019. This encompasses illicit acts of corruption.
The second type of corruption is state capture, which refers to the domination of public policy and institutions by powerful private interests. Criminal corruption has contributed to the worsening climate crisis.
Numerous cases related to the extractive industries, such as mining, have facilitated the continued use of coal and coal-fired power plants while leading to the destruction of carbon-absorbing forests.
For instance, in 2024, the South Sumatra High Prosecutor’s Office handled an illegal coal mining case causing potential state losses of 488 billion rupiah (US$31mil).
In 2018, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) investigated bribery related to the Riau-1 coal-fired power plant involving high-ranking officials and business people.
In 2023, the Supreme Court found conglomerate Surya Darmadi guilty of corruption related to the conversion of forests into palm oil plantations.
Corruption is also known to have obstructed climate adaptation and mitigation efforts. Budget embezzlement or irregularities in procurement of goods and services undermine the effectiveness of these initiatives.
It is important to note that large budgets are particularly vulnerable to corruption. From 2018 to 2021, the government allocated a climate change budget of 418.59 trillion rupiah, with actual expenditures amounting to only 365.42 trillion rupiah.
Climate adaptation often involves infrastructure projects, such as earthquake or flood mitigation efforts, which are particularly vulnerable to corruption.
A report by Indonesia Corruption Watch highlighted a 50% rise in climate adaptation infrastructure corruption cases from 2015 to 2018. Corruption also affects spatial planning, a crucial element in assessing climate risks.
The KPK has flagged spatial planning as vulnerable to corruption and included it in the National Corruption Prevention Strategy.
As with adaptation efforts, climate mitigation initiatives frequently involve infrastructure projects aimed at reducing emissions, which are particularly susceptible to corruption.
In 2022, for instance, the East Kutai Prosecutor’s Office handled a corruption case involving the procurement of solar power plants, which resulted in state losses of 53.6 billion rupiah.
In 2024, the KPK investigated allegations of bribery in a railway project, while in 2013, the antigraft agency probed into corruption in the procurement of public buses in Jakarta.
State capture involves systemic corruption by oligarchs, with an aim to maintain or increase their wealth and power. Unlike criminal corruption, it is harder to detect and prosecute this kind of corruption because it manipulates laws, policies and institutions.
The phenomenon of state capture has the potential to subvert environmental policies, impeding climate action and exacerbating environmental degradation under the pretext of legality.
Examples of this practice can be traced in the 2020 revision of the Mineral and Coal Law, which gives business actors the freedom to exploit coal, or the 2020 Job Creation Law, which removed coal downstreaming royalties, benefiting businesses at the expense of the state.
The draft bill on new and renewable energy also requires further examination, as it classifies coal as “new energy”, which may favour business interests.
Other harmful policies include food estate projects that often lead to deforestation while benefiting certain business actors.
While these projects could aid climate adaptation, they often fail in practice, with reports of abandoned land and crop failures.
Corruption also presents a significant obstacle to the just energy transition.
For example, instances of corruption within the electric vehicle battery production chain, such as mining of critical minerals, have the potential to cause severe environmental damage and adversely impact local communities by undermining livelihoods and endangering public health due to the pollution they cause.
It is also worth noting that climate financing mechanisms, like the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), prioritise infrastructure projects that are vulnerable to corruption, such as renewable energy development and power transmission.
In summary, corruption exacerbates the climate crisis and hinders effective climate action. Both crises demand significant attention from us all.
There is no other option but to address corruption more thoroughly in the context of the climate crisis.
It is crucial to recognise the role of graft in exacerbating the crisis and obstructing solutions. — The Jakarta Post/ANN
Egi Primayogha is coordinator of Political Corruption Division at Indonesia Corruption Watch. The views expressed here are the writer’s own.