In recent years, the EU has frequently intervened in market operations under the guise of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures, with many targeting China. — China Daily
OVER the past few years, the United States has relentlessly pressured its allies to comprehensively contain China, leading to dramatic shifts in global geopolitics.
The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis and the Israel-Palestine conflict, coupled with the European Union’s (EU) declining competitiveness, has increased negative factors in the EU’s policy toward China, resulting in a growing trend toward politicisation and securitisation.
The EU has inherent economic openness needs. Historically, it has pursued a generally free trade-oriented foreign economic policy.
However, as the EU’s economic competitiveness has declined, protectionist sentiments in some member states have risen, prompting the EU to adopt numerous trade relief measures.
In recent years, the EU has frequently intervened in market operations under the guise of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures, with many targeting China.
Since the beginning of 2024, the EU has launched multiple investigations against Chinese companies, including the Chinese train manufacturer CRRC Corp, under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, and conducted raids on the offices of Chinese enterprises in Europe.
Since July 5, the EU has imposed provisional countervailing duties on imports of battery electric vehicles from China.
The EU has also imposed various restrictions on bilateral investment between China and Europe and intensified controls on high-tech exports, which has fostered an atmosphere of politicisation and securitisation.
The EU’s trade and economic policy toward China has become increasingly suspicious and defensive.
The difference in political systems between China and the EU is not a new issue. For a long time, this difference has not impeded cooperation between China and Europe, whether in the economic field or in international affairs, where they have been good dialogue and cooperation partners.
However, since the EU’s 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook labelled China as a key partner for cooperation but also an “economic competitor” and “systemic rival”, ideological factors have increasingly influenced the EU’s China policy.
In recent years, the EU has significantly increased its negative rhetoric and actions regarding “human rights” and other issues related to the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region and the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions.
The European Parliament has issued several reports on China focusing on values and ideological concern. Some European politicians, including members of the European Parliament, have frequently visited Taiwan, to highlight the so-called democracy versus authoritarianism issue.
In the economic field, the EU has also started viewing China more through an ideological lens, as evidenced in recent legislations such as the “directive on corporate sustainability due diligence”, which have strong ideological and value orientations.
In terms of diplomacy, the EU is more focused on geopolitical competition. When Ursula von der Leyen took over as president of the European Commission in 2019, she declared the intention to form a “geopolitical commission”.
The EU has strengthened its coordination with the United States, setting up the US-EU Trade and Technology Council to project a unified Western voice. Meanwhile, EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have released “Indo-Pacific “strategies and enhanced their engagement with countries in the Global South.
The EU’s geopolitical orientation has become more apparent in its competition with China and its efforts to counter what it perceives as Chinese influence. For instance, the EU’s Global Gateway strategy is aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The discussion of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council meetings, as well as the communiques from the Group of Seven and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) summits, have increasingly centered on China. Notably, Nato’s 2022 Strategic Concept defined China as a “systemic rival” for the first time.
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the foundation of China-EU relations remains strong, and the EU’s necessity for collaboration with China has not decreased but rather heightened.
First, the economic foundation of China-EU relations is deep-rooted with significant mutual benefits.
The EU is China’s second-largest trading partner, second-largest source of imports, and second-largest export market, while China is the EU’s second-largest trading partner, largest source of imports, and third-largest export destination.
Despite a decrease in trade volume in 2023, trade between China and the EU reached US$783bil. EU investment in China increased by 5.5% year-on-year, totaling US$10.6bil in 2023.
In terms of both imports and exports, China is crucial to the EU economy, and damaging this relationship would harm the EU’s own economic interests.
Second, the EU needs to collaborate with China to address global issues and challenges.
The EU is confronted with a range of problems such as the Ukraine crisis, the Israel-Palestine conflict and climate change.
Unlike the US’ hegemonic “America First” approach, China and the EU share many similar or aligned positions on upholding the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, basic norms of international relations, and multilateralism.
Third, there are numerous dialogue and communication mechanisms between China and the EU that facilitate mutual trust and the exploration of more cooperation opportunities.
Bilateral face-to-face exchanges between officials, scholars and business circles have increased remarkably since 2023.This helps enhance political trust and guide the healthy and stable development of China-EU relations.
Currently, the EU’s politicisation and securitisation pose challenges to China-EU relations.
There is an urgent need for China and the EU to build mutual trust, manage differences and reduce misunderstandings. — China Daily/ANN
Zhang Jian is vice-president and a researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. The views expressed here are the writer’s own.
