Fresh ties: President Xi Jinping and Prabowo shake hands at the Great Hall of the People when he visited Beijing in April. — Reuters
THE US-China rivalry, as manifested in the trade war and heightened tensions in the South China Sea, has far-reaching impacts, from economic to security sectors. Since Indonesia is one of the affected countries, it is important to understand where Indonesia stands amid the great powers’ rivalry.
Concerns over the use of nuclear weapons in South-East Asia cannot be underestimated. The formation of the trilateral security pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (Aukus) allows nuclear-armed submarines to pass through the South China Sea, thus increasing regional tensions. The potential for open military conflict between the two great powers in the region is a primary concern.
In the economic sector, Indonesian academics assess that the US-China trade war could cause instability in international trade, including a decline in Indonesia’s export value. However, Indonesia also has the opportunity to capitalise on it, especially in attracting investment from companies looking to relocate their manufacturing bases from China. This can boost Indonesia’s economy, create jobs and fill the market gap between the two countries.
The US-China rivalry opens the door for China to emerge as a new alternative power to balance the US. As seen during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the US’ role in multilateral forums declined, posing a threat to global health governance, China stepped in with a multilateral approach to lead collective action in addressing the pandemic.
It is certainly a positive development to have multiple alternatives, but it can also be a threat when Indonesia or other countries are placed in a position of having to choose between the two great powers. So, what can the new Indonesian government under Prabowo Subianto do to deal with the US-China rivalry?
With the US-China conflict in mind, the new national leadership under President Prabowo and Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka must consider Indonesia’s foreign policy patterns and strategies, and whether they will opt for continuation or change.
First, Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy remains the fundamental principle of its foreign diplomacy. However, navigating this principle in an ever-changing and challenging international environment requires innovative and adaptive strategies, while continuing to use Asean as a multilateral diplomatic platform. Indonesia’s leadership in Asean serves as both an asset and a vital strategy for addressing threats from the US and China.
Second, the dominance of the view among Indonesian academics that see the US-China rivalry as a threat reflects not only today’s international reality, but also the policies or strategies that will be adopted by Indonesia’s new leadership. For instance, Prabowo’s military background greatly influences his view on the South China Sea conflict and which steps Indonesia should prioritise.
During the third presidential debate on international relations on Jan 7, Prabowo firmly stated that “The situation in the South China Sea underscores that we need a strong defense force, we need patrol platforms, we need satellites, we need a lot [...] and that defense must be built.”
In August 2024, Australia and Indonesia agreed to enhance the 2012 Defense Pact between the two countries, which allows for more expansive joint military exercises. While this could be one of the patrol platforms Prabowo mentioned to address escalating conflicts in the region, it must be remembered that defense-security strategies should not be Indonesia’s priority response given its current capacity and capabilities.
Third, Indonesia will remain a strategic destination for the US and China to exert their influence. Indonesia’s domestic needs can serve as a binding force in its relationships with both the US and China, whether in political security or economic development, as well as in balancing power in the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia must have a distinctive and relevant geopolitical strategy, just as it once championed the vision of the Global Maritime Fulcrum, recalibrating its national geopolitical strategy to safeguard Indonesia’s national interests amid the competing strategies of the Belt and Road Initiative and the free and open Indo-Pacific.
Ultimately, Indonesia’s foreign policy direction and strategy under President Prabowo’s new leadership do not necessarily need to offer something completely new; what is essential is that it provides a forward-looking approach that can keep the region relevant amid the ongoing US-China rivalry.
Instead of playing a passive role and merely “navigating between the two reefs”, Indonesia should consider enhancing its ability to “sail in the turbulent oceans” to manage regional uncertainties that pose threats, while also offering opportunities for cooperation. — The Jakarta Post/ANN
